






Last year, the H1N1 pandemic thrust the flu
into headlines around the globe.
Even though it was viewed as a relatively mod-
erate pandemic, the novel H1N1 Influenza
(A) virus still had a serious impact on the
United States -- infecting around 20 percent of
Americans (approximately 60 million individ-
uals), and resulting in approximately 274,000
hospitalizations and 12,000 deaths.1 More
people were hospitalized from H1N1 than are
typically hospitalized from the seasonal flu.
About 90 percent of the Americans who died
from H1N1 were under the age of 65, and at
least 340 children died from H1N1.2 However,
according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) the actual number
of deaths in children could be as high as be-
tween 910 and 1,880. 
The H1N1 outbreak dramatically raised
awareness about the threat that the flu poses,
but now that a vaccine is widely available for
H1N1 as part of the seasonal vaccine and
concerns about the severity of the new strain
of the virus have diminished, there is a real
likelihood that the country will return to
complacency in its attitude toward the flu.  
Nevertheless, there remains a significant risk
that a more serious new “pandemic” strain of
the flu could still emerge.  If a new flu virus
emerged that was as severe as the 1918 pan-
demic, it could lead to 90 million Americans
becoming sick, 2.2 million deaths, and major
economic losses.3 According to Carolyn B.
Bridges, M.D., of CDC, “just because we’ve
just had a pandemic does not mean we’ve de-
creased our chances of having another.  We
have to stay vigilant.”4 For instance, as one
potential concern, as of August 2010, there
have been 500 total cases – including 300
deaths – from the H5N1 “bird” flu that pub-
lic health officials and researchers around the
globe have been tracking.5
We continue to face a serious threat each flu
season.  Seasonal flu is preventable with a vac-
cine, yet millions of Americans still needlessly
get the flu each year.  The flu is often seen as
a nuisance, but it is actually very serious.  Ac-
cording to CDC, between 1976 and 2007, flu-
related deaths in the United States  have
ranged from a low of around 3,000 to a high
of 49,000 Americans each year.6 Even for
people who get sick, they need to take sick
leave from work, possibly costing their pay
and costing employers in lost productivity
and the economy as a whole.  In fact, the flu
contributes to more than $10 billion in lost
productivity and direct medical expenses in
the United States each year and another $16
billion in lost potential earnings.7
This year, following the H1N1 pandemic, the
country could take two different paths:  we
could go back to a national complacency
around the flu or we could build on the mo-
mentum of response efforts and work toward
increasing the number of Americans who are
vaccinated to spare millions from suffering
yearly from the seasonal flu and to better pre-
pare the country for future health emergen-
cies and disease outbreaks.  
In this issue brief, the Trust for America’s
Health (TFAH) examines recommendations to
build on the momentum created by the invest-
ments over the past several years, prepare for a
potential flu pandemic, enhance seasonal flu
prevention and response efforts, and improve
how the country routinely deals with the flu.
The first section reviews ways to protect more
Americans from the flu by increasing vacci-
nation rates, and the second section exam-
ines issues that must be addressed to
continue to prepare the country for future
pandemics and other health emergencies.  
2I. INCREASING FLU VACCINATION RATES FOR THE SEASONAL FLU
AND FUTURE PANDEMIC FLU OUTBREAKS
This year, for the first time, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), which
advises CDC on vaccine issues, has recom-
mended that all Americans -- ages six months
and older -- should be vaccinated this flu season.
A single vaccine will protect people against the
seasonal viruses, which now includes  H1N1.
Since flu is highly preventable, encouraging all
Americans to get vaccinated could greatly re-
duce the number of people who get sick and die
from flu complications -- and cut down on
missed school days and lost productivity from
people who are out sick from the flu.
This recommendation is a dramatic shift in our
national approach to the flu and presents a major
challenge to implement.  In an October 2010
public opinion survey conducted by Consumer
Reports, only 37 percent of respondents said they
would definitely get this season’s flu vaccine.8
Traditionally, flu vaccination rates for adults (ages
18 and older) have been low.  Only around 30 per-
cent of American adults have routinely been vac-
cinated.9 One reason for these low rates is
because there has been a long standing focus on
vaccinating seniors (ages 65 and older), who are
seen as one of the highest-risk groups for compli-
cations from the seasonal flu, and other high-risk
groups, including young children and individuals
with underlying chronic health conditions.  For
the 2010-11 flu season a new high dose vaccine is
available for those 65 and older.10 According to
Dr. Greg Poland of the Mayo Clinic, the new vac-
cine has four times the concentration of the ma-
terial that stimulates the body to make antibodies,
causing greater protection for older adults.11
ACIP has not yet recommended a preference for
the normal or high-dose vaccine for seniors.
Focusing on vaccinating seniors has helped con-
tribute to an imbalance in vaccination rates based
on age.  For instance, nearly 70 percent of seniors
were vaccinated in 2008, while only 24.1 percent
of adults under the age of 50 were vaccinated. 
Child flu vaccination rates have also historically
been low.   During the 2008-09 flu season, only
24 percent of children, ages 6 months to 17
years, received a seasonal flu vaccination.12
During H1N1, young children, young adults,
and pregnant women were generally the top pri-
ority groups for vaccination.  Since only a lim-
ited amount of vaccine was available at the start
of the fall 2009 flu season, vaccination efforts
first targeted the highest risk groups.  As vac-
cines became more available, efforts expanded
to vaccinate the general population.
By the end of June 2010, around 27 percent of
Americans -- more than 80 million individuals --
were vaccinated against H1N1.13 By the time vac-
cinations were opened up to the general popu-
lation, the virus had proven to be relatively
moderate, which decreased much of the interest
and incentive for the rest of public to seek vacci-
nation.  The H1N1 vaccination rate for children
was nearly double that of adults, with more than
40 percent of children receiving vaccinations,
compared to fewer than 23 percent for adults.14
Seasonal flu vaccination rates reached histori-
cally high levels -- with 40 percent of adults ages
18 and older and 44 percent of children ages six
months to 17 years old receiving the seasonal flu
vaccination during the 2009-10 flu season.15
The following chart includes H1N1 vaccinations
by state for the initial period of the outbreak -- end-
ing in January 2010.  During this time, many loca-
tions initially had limited supplies of vaccine,
which they targeted toward the most high-risk
groups.  Nationally, including the time period
when the vaccine was widely available to the entire
population and disease transmission had largely
ended, overall vaccination rates only grew by two
percent -- from nearly 25 to 27 percent -- from the
end of January to the end of the flu season.  
Adult H1N1 vaccination rates were the highest
in South Dakota (34.4 percent), Maine (32.0
percent), and Minnesota (28.5 percent) and
lowest in Mississippi (8.7 percent) and Alabama
(10.7 percent).
Childhood H1N1 vaccination rates were the
highest in Rhode Island (84.7 percent) and Ver-
mont (72.3 percent) and lowest in Georgia (21.3
percent) and Louisiana (24.1 percent).
3Estimated influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccination coverage
among children and adults, by state -- United States, BRFSS and National
2009 H1N1 Flu Survey (NHFS), end of January 2010.
State Children aged 6 mos to 17 yrs Persons aged ≥18 yrs
% (95% CI) % (95% CI)
Alabama 29.2 (+/-6.4) 10.7 (+/-1.9)
Alaska 26.6 (+/-5.6) 24.5 (+/-8.8)
Arizona 40.3 (+/-10.2)** 20.1 (+/-5.1)
Arkansas 50.0 (+/-19.7)§§ ** 15.7 (+/-2.8)
California 31.2 (+/-5.5) 17.7 (+/-2.9)
Colorado 35.2 (+/-11.2)§§ ** 20.4 (+/-3.0)
Connecticut 43.2 (+/-6.6) 15.2 (+/-3.8)
Delaware 45.4 (+/-8.7) 18.8 (+/-4.6)
DC 38.7 (+/-13.3) 14.6 (+/-4.5)
Florida 32.3 (+/-6.1) 16.1 (+/-2.1)
Georgia 21.3 (+/-5.0) 15.3 (+/-3.6)
Hawaii 55.4 (+/-10.9)** 23.4 (+/-3.7)
Idaho 29.5 (+/-5.6) 17.8 (+/-3.2)
Illinois 37.5 (+/-5.9) 21.6 (+/-3.7)
Indiana 46.7 (+/-7.7) 19.7 (+/-2.6)
Iowa 47.7 (+/-6.7) 27.4 (+/-3.4)
Kansas 39.4 (+/-6.5) 21.0 (+/-2.7)
Kentucky 31.8 (+/-5.3) 17.1 (+/-2.6)
Louisiana 24.1 (+/-4.3) 11.9 (+/-2.2)
Maine 60.2 (+/-9.4) 32.0 (+/-5.1)
Maryland 41.3 (+/-7.1) 21.4 (+/-2.8)
Massachusetts 60.3 (+/-8.8) 27.8 (+/-3.3)
Michigan 31.2 (+/-7.4) 15.3 (+/-2.6)
Minnesota 44.2 (+/-5.8) 28.5 (+/-4.3)
Mississippi 28.2 (+/-5.6) 8.7 (+/-1.9)
Missouri 27.5 (+/-6.2) 12.7 (+/-2.7)
Montana 33.6 (+/-5.6) 20.2 (+/-2.9)
Nebraska 40.8 (+/-6.3) 24.0 (+/-3.1)
Nevada 25.2 (+/-6.0) 15.8 (+/-3.5)
New Hampshire 45.5 (+/-7.5) 22.9 (+/-3.9) 
New Jersey 32.7 (+/-4.6) 13.1 (+/-2.0)
New Mexico 39.3 (+/-12.1) 23.7 (+/-6.2)
New York 34.0 (+/-5.6) 18.3 (+/-3.8)
North Carolina 44.7 (+/-17.4)§§ 21.4 (+/-3.5)
North Dakota 42.1 (+/-6.3) 25.6 (+/-4.6)
Ohio 33.5 (+/-5.4) 18.0 (+/-2.3)
Oklahoma 25.2 (+/-5.4) 18.0 (+/-3.2)
Oregon 35.3 (+/-6.3) 20.9 (+/-3.3)
Pennsylvania 36.8 (+/-4.4) 14.5 (+/-2.2)
Rhode Island 84.7 (+/-6.6) 26.6 (+/-5.2)
South Carolina 37.6 (+/-5.8) 14.6 (+/-2.5)
South Dakota 45.8 (+/-8.0) 34.4 (+/-4.8)
Tennessee 34.5 (+/-10.0) 19.5 (+/-3.2)
Texas 24.9 (+/-4.7) 13.7 (+/-2.1)
Utah 31.0 (+/-6.1) 21.4 (+/-7.5)
Vermont§§ 72.3 (+/-6.3) 25.9 (+/-7.1)
Virginia 39.9 (+/-5.4) 22.6 (+/-3.6)
Washington 36.6 (+/-6.5) 23.4 (+/-3.1)
West Virginia 47.3 (+/-7.7) 18.2 (+/-2.7)
Wisconsin 30.6 (+/-7.8) 21.2 (+/-4.0)
Wyoming 32.6 (+/-6.0) 21.0 (+/-3.4)
§§ Estimates are based on NHFS only.
** Estimates might be unreliable because confidence interval half-width is >10.
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  “Interim Results: State-Specific Seasonal Influenza Vaccination Coverage —-
United States, August 2009—January 2010”  MMWR, 59(12);363-368, 2010.
In 2009-2010, seasonal flu vaccination rates for
adults ranged from a high of 52.5 percent in Min-
nesota and 52.3 percent in South Dakota to a low
of 32.4 percent in Nevada.  Seasonal flu vaccination
rates for children ranged from a high of 67.2 per-
cent in Hawaii to a low of 23.6 percent in Nevada.
4
Estimated seasonal influenza vaccination coverage among children and
adults, by state -- United States, BRFSS and National 2009 Flu Survey
(NHFS), end of January 2010.
State Children aged 6 mos to 17 yrs Persons aged ≥18 yrs
% (95% CI) % (95% CI)
Alabama 33.5 (+/-6.3) 36.4 (+/-2.9)
Alaska 35.0 (+/-8.4) 37.2 (+/-5.8)
Arizona 41.3 (+/-12.0)§ 40.4 (+/-4.8)
Arkansas*^ 65.3 (+/-15.8)§ 41.0 (+/-3.7)
California 33.7 (+/-4.8) 37.5 (+/-3.5)
Colorado^ 42.9 (+/-11.3)§ 42.4 (+/-2.7)
Connecticut 46.2 (+/-5.7) 41.3 (+/-4.1)
Delaware^ 42.9 (+/-6.6) 42.2 (+/-3.8)
DC^ 34.8 (+/-15.5)§ 41.4 (+/-5.0)
Florida* 26.4 (+/-4.3) 33.0 (+/-2.2)
Georgia 30.8 (+/-7.1) 35.4 (+/-4.0)
Hawaii* 67.2 (+/-8.3) 47.6 (+/-3.0)
Idaho 30.5 (+/-6.0) 35.1 (+/-2.8)
Illinois 39.1 (+/-6.9) 39.0 (+/-3.1)
Indiana 46.2 (+/-9.7) 39.2 (+/-2.5)
Iowa 44.1 (+/-5.8) 50.2 (+/-3.1)
Kansas* 38.3 (+/-3.8) 43.5 (+/-2.4)
Kentucky 37.1 (+/-5.6) 42.3 (+/-3.1)
Louisiana 42.2 (+/-5.2) 40.1 (+/-3.1)
Maine* 57.2 (+/-7.5) 46.2 (+/-2.7)
Maryland* 51.0 (+/-6.9) 42.3 (+/-2.7)
Massachusetts*^ 61.6 (+/-9.4) 47.5 (+/-3.0)
Michigan 32.4 (+/-5.9) 37.2 (+/-2.8)
Minnesota 49.2 (+/-5.5) 52.5 (+/-3.9)
Mississippi 31.7 (+/-10.4)§ 36.0 (+/-2.6)
Missouri 34.4 (+/-6.8) 39.7 (+/-3.4)
Montana* 31.6 (+/-5.3) 39.4 (+/-2.8)
Nebraska 42.9 (+/-7.7) 49.7 (+/-3.1)
Nevada* 23.6 (+/-5.2) 32.4 (+/-3.6)
New Hampshire 49.7 (+/-6.9) 46.2 (+/-3.6)
New Jersey^ 42.7 (+/-7.5) 36.1 (+/-2.4)
New Mexico 49.9 (+/-8.1) 44.3 (+/-3.5)
New York 40.6 (+/-7.1) 39.8 (+/-2.8)
North Carolina*^ 59.8 (+/-14.9)§ 40.9 (+/-2.9)
North Dakota 45.5 (+/-7.4) 44.0 (+/-3.2)
Ohio 35.3 (+/-6.1) 38.8 (+/-2.4)
Oklahoma 37.2 (+/-6.8) 41.6 (+/-3.3)
Oregon 34.7 (+/-6.7) 39.2 (+/-3.0)
Pennsylvania* 47.8 (+/-6.5) 40.6 (+/-2.3)
Rhode Island 57.0 (+/-10.8)§ 48.5 (+/-4.0)
South Carolina 32.6 (+/-6.0) 38.8 (+/-2.9)
South Dakota 54.0 (+/-8.2) 52.3 (+/-3.9)
Tennessee 44.5 (+/-8.9) 41.5 (+/-3.2)
Texas 40.5 (+/-4.7) 39.1 (+/-2.5)
Utah 36.5 (+/-8.6) 39.7 (+/-3.0)
Vermont^ 46.8 (+/-7.4) 39.8 (+/-4.0)
Virginia^ 40.8 (+/-6.0) 43.5 (+/-2.7)
Washington 43.9 (+/-7.4) 38.9 (+/-1.9)
West Virginia 41.2 (+/-9.8) 43.8 (+/-2.4)
Wisconsin 37.0 (+/-7.6) 40.6 (+/-3.3)
Wyoming 39.6 (+/-6.0) 39.7 (+/-2.5)




* Child estimates were
significantly different from







^ BRFSS data were not
collected for children in
Massachusetts, Vermont,
New Jersey, District of
Columbia, Virginia, North
Carolina, Arkansas, and
Colorado.  BRFSS data
were not collected for
adults aged 18-49 years
not at high risk in Ver-
mont and Delaware.
Source: Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Preven-
tion.  “Interim Results:
State-Specific Seasonal In-
fluenza Vaccination Cov-




5The H1N1 vaccination efforts revealed the need
to improve tracking systems of people who re-
ceived vaccinations.  Tracking systems are partic-
ularly important for monitoring vaccine adverse
events, adequate coverage of target populations,
and any inequities in access to the vaccine.
Encouraging more Americans to get vaccinated
will be a challenge and require a significant edu-
cation effort to ensure Americans know the ben-
efits and safety of the vaccine.  An October 2010
public opinion survey from the National Foun-
dation for Infectious Diseases (NFID) found that
43 percent of Americans do not plan to get a flu
shot this year.16 (The vaccine is available in both
a shot and nasal spray form).
Moving forward, in order to significantly in-
crease vaccination rates, a major campaign will
be needed to provide:
n Education about the need for a yearly seasonal
flu shot, focused on why everyone should get
immunized, and the safety of the shots; and 
n Increased easy access to flu shots, even to peo-
ple who are uninsured or do not receive reg-
ular medical care.
One strategy to begin increasing vaccination
rates involves targeting high priority areas or
areas that need special focus, including:
A. Increasing Education about the Need and
Safety of Flu Vaccines, Especially to Minor-
ity Groups:  Even though flu vaccinations are
considered very safe and effective, many
Americans still harbor concerns about the
safety of vaccines or believe myths that the
vaccine can cause a person to get the flu.  
Clear, consistent education campaigns must be
developed about the safety and effectiveness of
the vaccine -- and local efforts must be made to
ensure individuals know when to get shots and
where they are available, including alternatives
to going to their doctors’ offices.
Health reform presents an opportunity for a
wide-scale campaign to teach the public that flu
vaccines are a normal, safe part of a healthy life
and to teach providers that vaccines are not risky
for most patients.  The federal government
should consider leveraging a small portion of
the Prevention and Public Health Fund -- which
was created by health reform -- for an ongoing,
nationwide vaccine acceptance campaign to in-
form Americans of the need for everyone to be
vaccinated against seasonal influenza. 
At the peak of fears over H1N1 flu, some groups worried
about vaccines perpetuated a myth that it was safer to get
H1N1 than to be inoculated against it.  But data from Califor-
nia show that getting the flu was much more dangerous.  Ac-
cording to statistics from the California State Department of
Health, one in every 10,000 Californians who contracted
H1N1 died.17 Out of 13 million Californians who were vacci-
nated for H1N1, three people died, and it was not confirmed
that the deaths were necessarily linked to the vaccination.18
Flu vaccines are considered to be safe.  They are monitored by
several systems, including the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting
System (VAERS), a national voluntary reporting system jointly
operated by CDC and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). The system collects information about adverse events
and and it can potentially detect safety concerns, such as possi-
ble side effects that occur after the administration of vaccines.
Another major safety monitoring system is the Vaccine Safety
Datlink (VSD), a collaboration between CDC and eight large
medical care organizations that conduct rapid population-based
monitoring of the safety of flu vaccines as well as other vaccines.
A recent study of a seasonal influenza vaccine investigated the
effectiveness as well as the safety of the vaccine over two flu
seasons.  It found that the vaccine was safe and offered clinical
benefit that exceeded the risk.19
Severe adverse reactions to the flu vaccination are rare.
Other reactions are generally mild and self-limited, such as
soreness at the vaccination site, and seldom interfere with the
recipient’s daily routine.20
Officials also carefully examined the evidence before recom-
mending flu vaccines for all children six months and older.  A
number of studies found a low risk of minor adverse events in
vaccinated children, such as local skin reaction to injected vac-
cine, and wheezing or irritability after a nasal dose of vaccine.
Serious adverse events, including hospitalization or death,
were rare and not necessarily caused by the vaccine.21,22,23
In addition, a recent study of 49 Hutterite farming colonies in
western Canada showed how giving flu shots to schoolchild-
ren protects a whole community from the flu -- creating what
is called “herd immunity.”24 Doctors gave flu shots to half the
communities and placebos to the other half, and more than 10
percent of the adults and children in the placebo colony had
confirmed seasonal flu, compared to less than five percent of
those in the flu shots colonies.25
VACCINES ARE SAFE AND PROTECT THE COMMUNITY
Special, concerted outreach to minority groups
is particularly important, since minority groups
have much lower vaccination rates compared
with Whites -- but have higher rates of mortality
and pneumonia associated with the seasonal
flu.26 H1N1 also had a disproportionate impact
on racial and ethnic minorities.  Disease experts
suggest that overcrowding in urban areas and
higher rates of underlying chronic conditions
such as diabetes may make African-Americans
and Latinos at a greater risk of complications 
of influenza.  
H1N1 hospitalization rates for African-Americans,
Hispanics, and American Indian/Alaska Natives
were nearly twice as high rates for Whites.
n According to the Illinois Department of Pub-
lic Health, African-Americans and Latinos
were hospitalized at a rate of 23 per 100,000
compared to Whites at a rate of seven per
100,000 from April 2009 to December 2009.
They also found that the mortality rate was six
per 100,000 for Latinos, and seven per
100,000 for African-Americans, versus three
per 100,000 for Whites.28
n In Boston, 71 city residents were hospitalized
with H1N1 -- 49 percent of whom were
African-American and 28 percent who were
Latino, double each minority group’s pres-
ence in the city.  African-Americans and Lati-
nos also account for a disproportionate share
of the 477 laboratory confirmed cases of
H1N1 in Boston.29
nH1N1-related deaths among American Indi-
ans and Alaska Natives were four times higher
than rates for all other groups according to
data from 12 states across the nation.30
While racial and ethnic minorities were at higher
risk for complications from H1N1, vaccination
rates were often lower.31 As of March 2010, vac-
cination rates were 9.8 percent lower for African-
American adults than for Whites and 4.2 percent
lower for African-American children.  Rates were
11.5 percent lower for Hispanic adults, although
rates were 5.5 percent higher for Hispanic chil-
dren.  For seasonal flu in 2009-2010, vaccination
rates were 16.5 percent lower for African-Ameri-
can adults and 5.6 percent lower for African-
American children than for Whites, and 21.7
percent lower for Hispanic adults and 2.6 percent
lower for Hispanic children than for Whites.   
In order to increase minority vaccination rates,
campaigns must address negative beliefs and
misinformation.  Individualized, culturally ap-
propriate, evidence-based information was
found to be effective in increasing vaccination
rates among disadvantaged, racially diverse,
inner-city populations.32 To be effective in
reaching diverse audiences, information must
be provided in channels beyond the Internet,
such as radio and racial and ethnic publications
and television, and in languages other than Eng-
lish. Materials must be tailored to specific cul-
tural perspectives.  Communications should be
from a trusted source, such as religious and
community leaders.  Translations also need to
be idiomatic rather than word-for-word.33
During the H1N1 outbreak, CDC conducted a
series of focus groups to learn effective ways to
communicate about the flu.  Some key findings
included the following:
n The message “Every flu season is different, and
influenza can affect people differently.  Even
healthy children and adults can get very sick
from the flu and spread it to others” was a con-
cept that resonated with people who perceived
themselves to be at low risk from the flu;
n Using data and statistics makes messages more
credible and relevant.  The more tailored the
data for specific audiences, the more motivat-
ing the message;
n African-American focus group participants
particularly responded positively to images of
families and images that portrayed the older
protecting the younger and serving as a role-
model for positive health behaviors.34
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American Indian/Alaska Native 32.7
B. Making Flu Vaccinations Easy, Accessible, and
Affordable for All Americans -- With Special
Emphasis on Providing Shots for the Unin-
sured and Underinsured:  Every American
should have access to an affordable or free flu
shot.  Many doctors prefer and encourage pa-
tients to get vaccinated through their “medical
home” -- by their primary care physician or pe-
diatrician when possible -- or through other
doctors who provide them with regular care.  
However, many insured Americans do not re-
ceive regular well care or regularly see doctors.  
And millions of uninsured or underinsured Amer-
icans also go without regular care and also do not
have insurance to help pay for vaccination costs.
Making shots easily accessible and affordable
can greatly increase the chances that more
Americans will get vaccinated.  This requires
providing flu shots where it is convenient -- and
covering the cost of vaccines and the associated
administration fees through insurance or mak-
ing free shots available.
nMaking access to flu shots as convenient as
possible:  Strategies that focus on making vac-
cinations more convenient by “going where
the people are” to provide vaccines can dra-
matically help to increase vaccination rates.  It
is important to be sure that vaccines are ad-
ministered by trained health care professionals
in any location.  Active immunization registries
would be particularly helpful for being able to
track individual vaccinations to share infor-
mation with medical providers and population
vaccination trends.  Local health departments
will need additional support in order to be
able to offer clinics in a variety of sites and ven-
ues. It is also important to provide individuals
with a record of their vaccination so they can
share it with their doctors. This will help build
a better system where the information can be
directly provided to doctors, pediatricians, and
other health care professionals when individ-
uals receive a shot.  Public health officials
should work with groups and venues around
the community to offer easy locations to pro-
vide vaccinations, particularly large institutions
or places where people congregate.  Visiting
nurses can also come to locations, such as
workplaces, to provide shots.  Insurance plans
must also be willing and able to pay for vacci-
nations given outside of the traditional med-
ical home. Some venues that have been used
or could be considered to be used to offer flu
shots include:
s Pharmacies:  Many pharmacies provide flu
shots for a fee.  Many pharmacies also have
systems where they can bill a person’s in-
surance for payment.  
s Schools:  Shots can be provided to students,
but efforts should be made to provide infor-
mation about the vaccination to students’ pe-
diatricians.  Shots can also be provided to
teachers and other staff.  In addition, schools
are a good location to provide vaccinations
to parents and to members of the surround-
ing communities.
s Child care facilities:  In addition to chil-
dren, shots can be provided to all teachers
and day care providers, which help protect
the student community.  Caregiver protec-
tion is particularly important for infants
under six months of age, who are not able
to get the vaccine yet.
s Recreation centers and community centers.
s Faith-based organizations, such as
churches and synagogues.
s Community health centers and other
safety net providers.
s Health fairs.







nMaking sure uninsured and underinsured can
afford shots:  Lack of insurance should not put
any Americans at increased risk of getting sick
from the flu.  The recent health reform bill will
greatly expand the number of Americans with
access to health insurance in the coming years --
which will help provide insurance coverage for
more people to receive more vaccinations. The
flu vaccine will also be a required benefit with-
out cost sharing in the “new” plans.  However,
even as the different aspects of the new health
reform take effect, many will remain uninsured
or underinsured.  A lack of insurance may deter
many Americans -- particularly young adults and
lower-income individuals -- from getting vacci-
nated.  For instance, right now, many young
adults are ineligible for public programs, move
between schools and jobs, have shorter tenure
jobs, or work at entry-level jobs without benefits,
so they go without health insurance.  
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C. Encouraging Seasonal Flu Vaccinations for
All Health Care Workers:  Even though
health care workers typically work around sick
patients, their vaccination rates are often low.
As of January 2010, only 62 percent of health
care workers had been vaccinated against sea-
sonal flu, and only 37 percent received an
H1N1 flu shot.35 In typical years, the rates of
health care worker vaccinations are around 50
percent.  According to a survey of nurses, the
most common reason for not receiving a vac-
cine was concern about adverse reactions.36  
All health care personnel should receive the sea-
sonal influenza vaccine.  The ACIP has recom-
mended this policy since 1986.37 Studies have
repeatedly shown that Americans have great
trust in the advice of their health care providers.
Health care providers are role models as well as
trusted sources of information. Americans are
less likely to trust the safety of vaccines if their
providers are not vaccinated, and no one should
ever get the flu from their doctor, nurse, or med-
ical technician.  Influenza can be fatal for already
sick or immunocompromised patients.  Health
care professionals must themselves serve as role
models and stress the importance of the yearly
flu vaccination to patients.  The U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) is plan-
ning to include a section about flu vaccination
of health care workers in its revised action plan
to prevent health care-associated infections.38
There is currently a debate around whether
health care worker vaccination should be manda-
tory or voluntary.  In the meantime, the goal
should be 100 percent vaccination of health care
personnel.  For measurable progress to occur,
policymakers, employers, and the health care
workers themselves must commit to achieving as
close to universal seasonal flu vaccine coverage
of health care personnel as possible.  To be suc-
cessful, executive and senior staff in health care
facilities must be involved in ensuring wide-
spread vaccine acceptance and vaccination.
Proponents of mandatory vaccination policies be-
lieve the public health benefits of protecting pa-
tients and reducing worker absenteeism, as well as
the historically low rates under voluntary programs
and the mandate for health care workers to “do no
harm,” justify requiring vaccination as a condition
of employment.  Proponents of voluntary policies
argue that mandatory programs violate the civil
liberties of healthcare personnel, who should be
able to opt out of vaccination programs.  
Health facilities can incentivize workers to get vac-
cinated, including providing the vaccine for free,
comprehensive education for employees, and
publicly reporting vaccination rates. States and
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) could incentivize higher rates through
public reporting and/or lower reimbursement for
facilities that fail to meet certain standards, as it
will soon be doing with other quality measures.
The Joint Commission, which provides evalua-
tions and accreditation of hospitals and other
health care facilities, could strengthen its accred-
itation requirements related to facilities’ health
care worker vaccination programs by expanding
the flu vaccine standard to all accredited settings;
requiring public reporting of vaccination rates;
and setting a benchmark that facilities must meet.
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EXAMPLES OF WAYS TO HELP INCREASE HEALTH CARE WORKER
VACCINATION RATES
Some hospitals and health care settings are trying new policies to help encourage health care workers
to get vaccinated.
For example, at the Children’s Hospital and Medical Center in Omaha, Nebraska, employee vaccina-
tion rates climbed from around 50 percent to around 97 after some new policies were instituted, in-
cluding requiring staff to sign an explicit form if they decline vaccination that acknowledges the
possibility that not getting immunized could spread the virus to children and requiring workers who
did not get vaccinated to wear surgical masks through the flu season.39
II.  PREPARING FOR A POSSIBLE FUTURE PANDEMIC AND
OTHER HEALTH EMERGENCIES
The response to the H1N1 outbreak showed the
country was much better prepared to respond to a
pandemic than it would have been a few short years
ago.  There was an unprecedented large-scale na-
tionwide public health response including surveil-
lance, laboratory testing, public and practitioner
education, medical countermeasure management,
and the distribution and launch of a national vac-
cination campaign, all in a very short period of
time.  However, the outbreak also revealed major
ongoing gaps in America’s readiness for future
pandemics and other health emergencies.
Since the National Strategy for Pandemic In-
fluenza was issued in 2005 and building on the
efforts that came about after the September 11,
2001 tragedies and Hurricane Katrina, the coun-
try is significantly better prepared for pandemic
and other health emergencies.  As a result, the
country created a strong, in-depth national re-
sponse plan, which included defined and dele-
gated roles and responsibilities for every federal
agency and grants to support preparedness in
states. In addition, every state had a plan in
place that had been reviewed by the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS)
and included steps for how to set up mass vacci-
nation campaigns. Many communities, busi-
nesses, schools, and other organizations around
the country also created pandemic plans.
When H1N1 emerged in the spring of 2009, gov-
ernment officials acted quickly to respond.  Con-
gress appropriated $1.9 billion in emergency
supplemental funding and an additional $5.8
billion in contingency funding.  These funds
helped enhance vaccine production capacity,
purchase and distribute vaccines, upgrade sur-
veillance capabilities, and meet other needs.
However, the emergency funding could not
backfill long-existing gaps in the nation’s public
health infrastructure.  
The outbreak not only provided a real-world sce-
nario that tested pandemic plans, but also tested
the fundamentals of the overall public health
system, and showed that while plans and emer-
gency resources are important, plans can only
be effective if there is a strong enough public
health infrastructure to carry them out.  
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EVENTS OF H1N1
On April 26, 2009 a public health emergency was declared in the United States as cases of H1N1
began to spread across the country.  More than a year later, the emergency declaration expired on
June 23, 2010.  Approximately 60 million Americans had H1N1 during this time.  According to CDC,
around 274,000 people were hospitalized and 12,000 individuals in the United States may have died
from H1N1.40 Traditionally, about 90 percent of individuals who die due to complications from the flu
are over the age of 65, but in 2009, 90 percent of those Americans who died from H1N1 were under
65.41 In a typical year, about 100 flu-related deaths of children under the age of 18 are reported to
CDC, but during the pandemic, more than 300 flu-related deaths among children were reported to
CDC.42 Between April 2009 and January 2010, there were approximately 19 million cases among
those younger than 18, 33 million cases for those 18 to 64 and just five million for those 65 and over.43
WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE MODERATE IMPACT (OF H1N1). HAD THE VIRUS
TURNED MORE LETHAL, WE WOULD BE UNDER SCRUTINY FOR HAVING FAILED TO PROTECT
LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE.      44




EVERY INFLUENZA PANDEMIC IS DIFFERENT. PLANNING AND INVESTING IN KEY RESOURCES
AHEAD OF TIME, AND BEING ABLE TO NIMBLY ADJUST TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES ARE TWO
KEY LESSONS LEARNED SO FAR FROM THIS H1N1 PANDEMIC. THEY ARE ALSO LESSONS LEARNED
THAT WILL HELP US CONTINUE RESPONDING TO THIS EVENT AS WELL AS THE NEXT ONE.      45




In order to improve the health of the public, the national Public Health Accreditation Board (PHAB)
developed a national voluntary accreditation program for state, local, territorial and tribal public health
departments that will launch in 2011. The goal of the accreditation program is to improve and protect
the health of every community by advancing the quality and performance of public health departments.
A study conducted by the North Carolina Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Center
found that public health agencies accredited by the state of North Carolina performed a significantly
larger scope of activities in response to the H1N1 outbreak compared to non-accredited agencies,
and that these differences were “apparent in all domains of activity including planning, incident com-
mand, investigation, communication, and response and mitigation activities.”46
The findings suggest that participating in and meeting accreditation standards can help public health
departments effectively meet and demonstrate preparedness capabilities.
The H1N1 outbreak showed that transferring
plans from paper to action can be more difficult
than is often anticipated.  All local, state, federal,
and private pandemic plans should be evaluated
and revised based on lessons learned from the
H1N1 outbreak.  The challenges experienced
from the real-world implementation of pan-
demic plans revealed a number of lessons for fu-
ture planning, including that:
n Plans must be adaptable and science-driven.
Even if preparations are based on past expe-
riences, each disease outbreak is unique and
unpredictable, and requires constant re-
assessment of priorities and guidance for the
public and medical community.  For instance,
at the start of the H1N1 outbreak, no one
knew how severe the virus would be.  Officials
had to constantly reevaluate issues like school
closure recommendations to match changing
circumstances.  Some aspects of plans must be
flexible enough to adapt to changing circum-
stances as well as differing resources and situ-
ations across locations.  
n Establishing trust with the public through
clear and honest communication is impera-
tive.  If the public does not receive timely in-
formation or trust the information they
receive, they are unlikely to comply with rec-
ommendations.  This is particularly challeng-
ing when the situation is unfolding at the same
time when there is a need to communicate
with the public.  Messages must strike a bal-
ance between building trust and communi-
cating that the guidance will change.
Acknowledging uncertainty can be an impor-
tant component of building trust.  The H1N1
pandemic also showed the challenge and frus-
trations of communicating about priority
groups for vaccination and treatment, partic-
ularly when the groups were not consistent for
every community.  Since there could also be
limited early availability of vaccine in future
potential pandemic outbreaks of new strains
of the flu, it is important to create clear and
consistent priority group recommendations --
as well as clear mechanisms for communicat-
ing who the priority groups are and how they
change as circumstances unfold.  The lack of
an immediate widely available vaccine also un-
derscored the importance of having a strong,
clear message about basic hygiene and social
distancing, which are important to help slow
the spread of seasonal flu, and may also be par-
ticularly important in the early stages of out-
breaks before a vaccine is available.  Some
special communications concerns that arose
during the outbreak included:
A.  Addressing Real-World Lessons
sDeclaring “emergency” messages and pan-
demic level alerts:  According to an after ac-
tion report from the Association of State
and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO),
one unintended consequence that arose
from official public health emergency dec-
larations, which are often required to make
resources available, was that declarations
often “made the situation sound much more
severe and threatening than it actually
was.”47 One potential challenge for the fu-
ture is to find ways to legally declare emer-
gencies in ways that are consistent with
messages that officials want to convey to the
public.  Another problem was that it was not
clear what impact the declaration of a na-
tional health emergency was supposed to
have. In the years of planning, it was as-
sumed that such a declaration would mean
enhanced powers for health authorities, but
this did not happen. In some states, a state
declaration of an emergency seemed to be
necessary even though there was a national
declaration. In addition, ASTHO reports
that members of the public were often con-
fused by the difference between the World
Health Organization (WHO) pandemic rat-
ing announcements and statements from
HHS about the severity of the pandemic.  
s Reaching the highest risk populations who
often have the lowest trust levels:  The
H1N1 outbreak disproportionately impacted
racial and ethnic minorities -- at the same
time, these communities are often the most
reticent to trust government recommenda-
tions and messages.  To earn the trust of
these communities, special efforts must be
made to target racial and ethnic minorities
with communications that are tailored to res-
onate with these communities and are as
transparent and straightforward as possible.
It is essential that these relationships are es-
tablished and maintained on an ongoing
basis.  It is too late to try to establish this type
of trust during an emergency.  The ongoing
work of public health departments -- such as
reaching out to high risk communities
around the seasonal flu and working with
these communities on chronic disease pre-
vention -- provide numerous opportunities
for building and strengthening these ties.
These pre-established relationships could
lead to increased trust and hopefully in-
creased vaccination in a pandemic situation.  
n Recommendations for sick leave, school clos-
ings, and limiting community gatherings have
major ramifications that must be taken into
account.  Although community mitigation
measures, such as social distancing, are partic-
ularly important before a vaccine is available,
the H1N1 outbreak demonstrated the chal-
lenges with implementing these measures.  At a
news conference in late April 2009 President
Obama emphasized this: “If you are sick, stay
home.  If your child is sick, keep them out of
school.”48 These seemingly simple measures
proved to be more complicated in reality.
s Sick leave:  Health officials encouraged
people who were sick to stay home.  This
guidance can be hard to follow, particularly
for around 40 percent of American workers
in the private sector who do not have any
paid sick leave available.  This amounts to
approximately 40 million people, and dis-
proportionately includes women, lower-
wage workers, and part-time workers.49 In
addition to those lacking personal sick leave,
millions more do not have sick leave that en-
ables them to take time off to care for an ill
child, spouse, or parent.  Congressional leg-
islation has been introduced -- but not
passed -- to require employers with 15 or
more employees to offer a minimum of
seven paid sick days each year, which could
be used for individual health needs or to
care for sick family members.  
A report “Sick at Work: Infected Employ-
ees in the Workplace During the H1N1
Pandemic” released by the Institute for
Women’s Policy Research found that, al-
though almost 26 million employed Amer-
icans adults may have been infected with
H1N1 in 2009, nearly eight million em-
ployees took no time off work while in-
fected.  “Employees who attended work
while infected with H1N1 are estimated to
have caused the infection of as many as 7
million co-workers.”50 This could mean
that restaurants, child care centers, nurs-
ing homes, hotels, public transit systems,
schools, businesses, and health care
providers across the country may have
been operated and run by individuals in-
fected with the flu who lack the ability to
take sick leave.51
s School closings: Hundreds of schools across
the United States closed in the initial weeks
of the H1N1 outbreak.  Officials were not
sure how severe the outbreak would be, and
often chose to be cautious.  HHS Secretary
Kathleen Sebelius noted that with school
closings, “there is a large ripple effect.
What happens to the parents? Where do
those children go? Do you close the day
care center if a younger sibling is there?
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Many schools’ and communities’ emer-
gency plans will be put to the test during
the weeks and months to come.”52 During
the outbreak, public health officials re-
ported that implementation of school clos-
ings was difficult, and many parents ended
up dropping their children off at libraries,
community centers or other locations.53 A
public opinion survey by the Harvard
School of Public Health found that 43 per-
cent of respondents said school or daycare
closures would likely cause a loss of income
and money problems, and over a quarter of
parents responded that having to stay home
with children would cause them to lose
their job or business. 54
In the event of a future pandemic, if
schools need to be closed for a significant
period of time, issues of handling parental
sick leave and ways to limit interaction of at-
risk children must be addressed.  In addi-
tion, many families rely on food assistance
programs, particularly the National School
Lunch and Breakfast program, and before
and after school care, which could all be
disrupted during school closures. 
n Coordination across communities, states, and
countries is extremely complicated, but must
be a high priority.  The H1N1 outbreak
showed how difficult it can be to coordinate
across borders and even within local commu-
nities.  One challenge, according to the after
action report by ASTHO, was that states and lo-
calities were receiving guidance documents
and updates so frequently that they found it
hard to keep up with the information and
make timely decisions about the appropriate
next steps or what to communicate to their
stakeholders.55 For instance, according to an
after action report in California, “One rural
community stated that they would sometimes
have two or three versions of the same guid-
ance document and didn’t know which was the
most recent.”56 Some local health departments
have suggested centralizing how and where in-
formation comes from into a single, accessible
area to minimize the amount of time each
community had to spend synthesizing infor-
mation.57 Many local health departments also
reported that they relied on the routine sum-
maries of the CDC conference calls since it was
hard to keep pace with and synthesize the in-
formation provided on the numerous calls that
were being held.  In addition, health care
providers reported that communication be-
tween providers and the public health system
was often slow and uncoordinated.58
The H1N1 outbreak also showed how chal-
lenging it is to coordinate among countries,
particularly when they may have competing in-
terests when there is low availability of vaccines
or medicines.  For instance, when the out-
break was initially identified in Mexico, many
countries quickly tried to close borders and re-
strict travel despite recommendations from
public health experts, and different countries
around the globe had vastly differing levels of
investments and guidance around vaccines
and medicines.  Greater effort must go into
fostering international communications and
collaboration in responses to outbreaks.
n Limited legal authorities and competing
emergency declarations must be better co-
ordinated to avoid confusion and provide
protection to volunteers.  Thirty-three states
and D.C. had statutes that extended some level
of immunity to business and non-profit or-
ganizations providing charitable, emergency,
or disaster relief services, although these laws
varied greatly among states, according to a
study by the Public/Private Legal Prepared-
ness Initiative, North Carolina Institute for
Public Health.  In addition, according to the
Office of the General Counsel at HHS, volun-
teer health professionals and some paid health
personnel may or may not be covered under a
“patchwork” of federal liability protections.59
An H1N1 after action report conducted by
ASTHO found that legal authorities were an
issue in some states.  Lack of defined emer-
gency declaration or specific liability coverage
for medical volunteers during the H1N1 out-
break hindered the response and limited the
ability to provide care in some states.60 The
Medical Reserve Corps reported that in some
places, “the lack of state provisions ensuring li-
ability protections for health care and other
volunteers inhibited recruitment and made
some reluctant to volunteer initially to help
with H1N1 response activities.”61
In addition, multiple federal emergency dec-
larations, including the National Emergency
Act and the Stafford Act, created confusion
during the H1N1 pandemic.62 Follow-up
should be conducted to understand what was
effective in areas where existing laws worked
and what issues should be addressed to im-
prove the laws that did not work as well in other
places.  Before the next emergency, HHS and
states should also clarify what liability protec-
tions are in place for volunteer health profes-
sionals and attempt to translate the current
patchwork of federal and state protections into
coherent, defined liability coverage.  
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n Building a Stronger Foundation
Notwithstanding the strong federal, state, and local
response, the H1N1 outbreak highlighted gaps in
U.S. preparedness to face not just future health
emergencies, but also to satisfy ongoing responsi-
bilities required to respond to the seasonal flu.
Numerous after action reports, including those
from ASTHO and the National Association of
County and City Health Officials (NACCHO),
called for a more consistent and robust invest-
ment in the underlying core infrastructure that
supports the response to any and all health
emergencies as well as regular activities.63, 64
During the H1N1 outbreak, the capacity of
health departments to track, investigate, and
contain cases of H1N1 was pushed to the limit
due to lack of resources.  However, instead of
new investments to help replenish and fill gaps
in the public health system, departments around
the country are experiencing major cuts.  
Prior to the H1N1 outbreak, public health de-
partments’ resources, funding, and personnel
were already stretched thin from budget reduc-
tions that were measured beginning in 2008, mak-
ing it challenging to conduct effective seasonal flu
vaccination public education campaigns, track the
spread and severity of the seasonal flu virus strain,
and hold vaccination clinics with trained staff.
During the second half of 2009, almost half of
local health departments lost necessary work-
force, adding up to 8,000 lost jobs.  Layoffs and at-
trition to the local health department workforce
in the last six months of 2009 combined with the
15,000 jobs already lost from 2008-2009 resulted
in a cumulative loss of 23,000 jobs.  In addition to
lost jobs, during the latter half of 2009, 13,000
local health department employees were affected
by shortened work weeks and mandatory fur-
loughs because of budget cuts.65
The current economic climate means states and
localities are facing budget shortfalls and many
have cut funding and staff for public health de-
partments.  According to the Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, 48 states are experiencing
shortfalls in their budgets for FY2010 that total
$168 billion, which is one-quarter of state budg-
ets.66 Future predictions are that the situation will
get worse in FY 2011.67 Public health funding is
discretionary spending in most states and, there-
fore, is at high risk for significant cuts during eco-
nomic downturns.  While few states allocate funds
directly for public health preparedness, state and
local funding is essential for supporting public
health infrastructure and core capacities of
health departments.  Everyday programs, serv-
ices, and resources must be maintained and re-
main strong and scalable to serve as a solid
foundation to more effectively respond to large-
scale public health events. 
While there was the quick release of emergency
supplemental funding for the H1N1 response,
public health departments were also experienc-
ing budget and staffing cutbacks, making these
new and one-time funds not necessarily additive.
Because they were short-term funds, states often
could not rehire lost personnel or require work
during state-mandated furlough days.  Much of
the success experienced by state and local health
departments in responding to the H1N1 pan-
demic was attributable to the years of planning,
training, and relationship-building that emer-
gency preparedness funding had made possible
over the previous decade.  Budget cuts were
overcome by the flow of Public Health Emer-
gency Response (PHER) funds from the federal
government.  These were one-time only funds,
which helped the response but will not help
build a lasting and effective infrastructure.68
Over the years, federal funding for state and
local public health preparedness has also
eroded.  In fiscal year (FY) 2009, the funds for
the federal cooperative agreement grants that
support state and local public health prepared-
ness was down approximately 25 percent from
FY 2005 levels.    A portion of these remaining
funds were also in jeopardy when the Adminis-
tration had also proposed cutting $184 million
from the Public Health Emergency Program
(PHEP) cooperative agreements for FY 2011,
but Congress did not end up making these cuts. 
Some key areas that need to be at the ready for
any potential emergency and to respond to the
seasonal flu, but are often lacking due to limited
resources include:
n Up-to-date and available pharmaceuticals, vac-
cines, and medical equipment;
n Surge capacity to provide mass care to pa-
tients; and
n Core public health infrastructure, such as sur-
veillance, laboratory capacity and workforce.
Without increased and sustained investments in
core public health functions, the country will al-
ways be less than optimally ready for health
emergencies -- leaving Americans open to un-
necessary risks.
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The H1N1 outbreak showed how important it is
to maintain the research and development of
up-to-date countermeasures, including vaccines
and antiviral medications, and to keep enough
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment stock-
piled for emergencies.  Having the ability to re-
spond quickly is essential during an outbreak or
emergency, but requires an ongoing investment
in pharmaceutical research and development
and stockpiling of medicines and equipment.  
Last year, scientists raced against the clock to de-
velop a vaccine to protect against the H1N1 flu
strain, yet they were operating with an outdated vac-
cine research capacity and technology.  Despite
these challenges, vaccine manufacturers were able
to produce limited quantities of vaccine by mid-fall,
which public health officials directed to the high-
est-risk populations. However, it took until later in
the year before enough vaccine was available for the
entire U.S. population.  This delay in the supply fur-
ther discouraged people from getting vaccinated.
In addition to vaccine development, within one
week of the outbreak, the Strategic National
Stockpile (SNS) delivered more than 11 million
courses of antiviral drugs, 12.5 million face-
masks, and 25 million N-95 respirators to 62 pre-
determined areas in states and localities around
the country.  These materials included 25 per-
cent of the states’ fixed pandemic influenza al-
locations and was the first large scale distribution
of its kind.69 In the fall, an additional 535,000
courses of antiviral drugs and 59.7 million N-95
respirators were also deployed from the SNS in
response to the pandemic emergency.
The rapid development of a vaccine despite lim-
ited production capabilities and the quick dis-
tribution of antivirals and other equipment were
only possible due to prior investments in re-
search and development, stockpiling, and prac-
tice in drills and tabletop exercises.  
In late August 2010, the Obama administration
announced a plan to build the medical counter-
measure capacity to respond to future pandemic
and bioterrorism threats, including plans to use
$1.9 billion, most of which would come from the
H1N1 response.70 A large portion of these funds
would be devoted to improving the capability to
quickly develop drugs and vaccines in the case of
a pandemic -- including $822 million for pan-
demic influenza vaccine development, $200 mil-
lion to create a government sponsored firm to
create innovation in the pharmaceutical indus-
try, and $170 million to improve FDA regulation
of the drug-development process.71
During this period, issues related to vaccines, an-
tivirals, and medical equipment that should be
addressed came to light, including:
n Improving Vaccine Research and Develop-
ment:  An August 2010 report released by the
President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology (PCAST) highlighted five key
points necessary to improve vaccine capabili-
ties in the United States to prepare for possi-
ble future pandemics, including:72
1) Surveillance: Accelerate identification of
newly emerging pandemic viruses, so vaccine
production can start sooner;
2) Seed viruses: Develop a collection of stock
viral “backbones” to allow faster production
of specific vaccine strains;
3) Sterility tests: Develop better and faster tests
to ensure sterility during vaccine production;
4) Potency-test reagents: Develop faster and more
reliable tests to document vaccine potency; and
5) Fill-and-finish: Enlarge capacity and mod-
ernize machinery used in final stages of vac-
cine production, including vial-filling.
In addition, a number of promising studies are un-
derway to find a “universal” flu vaccine, which
would have the potential to provide protection to
individuals from all flu strains for decades.  How-
ever, this vaccine may still be years away from being
available to medical and public health officials.
n Replenishing and Coordinating the Antiviral
Stockpile:  Overall, according to after action re-
ports, the deployment and distribution of ma-
terials from the SNS went according to plan.73,
74 However, there was not a clear mechanism
for tracking how antivirals from the SNS were
used and there is uncertainty of how many SNS
supplies states have left.  Antivirals deployed
from the SNS were replenished in summer
2009.  In addition, other issues related to an-
tiviral distribution and guidance include:  
sMany states reported that they were unsure
about administering countermeasures, fees
for dispensing, and costs of recovering and
disposing of expired countermeasures.  In
the ASTHO after action report, one state
replied that, “guidance from CDC for treat-
ment was excellent; however, guidance on
how and when to use the stockpile was ab-
sent;”  lack of guidance on triggers and
strategies for antiviral also made it difficult
for local health departments to manage an-
tivirals they received from the state.
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1. Ensuring Up-to-Date And Available Pharmaceuticals, Vaccines, and 
Medical Equipment
s Some local health departments lacked stor-
age or cold chain management (climate-
controlled storage) capabilities for SNS
supplies.  A number of localities returned
unused supplies to the states or distributed
them to hospitals instead;75
s According to an upcoming, not-yet- published
report from a think tank NACCHO con-
vened, local health departments experienced
a range of additional challenges related to an-
tiviral use and distribution, including that:
• While local health departments had pre-
paredness plans that outlined strategies
for receiving, storing, distributing, dis-
pensing, and tracking antivirals, plans
often lacked the level of detail, infra-
structure, and formalized agreements re-
quired to operationalize those strategies.
• As CDC antiviral guidance evolved to re-
flect the epidemiology and practices dur-
ing H1N1, it was challenging for local
health departments to similarly modify
their plans and communicate these
changes to stakeholders.  For example,
local health departments had difficulty ex-
plaining to first responders why national
guidance no longer prioritized them over
other groups for antiviral treatment.
• During H1N1, local health departments
needed to communicate how antivirals
should be used, where antivirals were avail-
able, and what groups were prioritized to
receive them.  This information was both
difficult to obtain from state health depart-
ments and communicate with the public,
which led to delays in messaging and hin-
dered the ability of local health depart-
ments to be in front of the situation early.
This impacted the ability of local health de-
partments to ensure timely access to antivi-
rals.  Communication was especially
difficult in jurisdictions where providers
and other antiviral prescribers did not per-
ceive the local health department as the
opinion leader in the community.  
sMany people received commercially-sup-
plied antivirals through the private phar-
macy system, which complicated plans for
decisions around the government release
of the federal stockpile; and
s States and localities noted the need for
more guidance about the use and dosing
of oseltamivir (Tamiflu) for children.76
There are still no stockpile goals for antivi-
rals suitable for children in the SNS.
n Ensuring Adequate Availability of Appropriate
Emergency Medical Equipment: There were
conflicting opinions during the H1N1 outbreak
on what type of facemasks or respirators should
be used by medical professionals.  In Septem-
ber 2009, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) ad-
vised physicians and other health care
professionals to use fitted N-95 respirators,
while CDC recommended N-95 use for health
care workers, but recommended against their
use in community and home settings except po-
tentially for people at increased risk for severe
illness from the flu. Meanwhile, the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) supported the use of facemasks and N-
95 respirators in the workplace and suggested
employers should stockpile facemasks and res-
pirators in case of a pandemic.77, 78, 79, 80 More
research will help lead to consensus about how
to best protect health care workers during a
pandemic.  In September 2010, CDC released
new guidance for preventing flu in health care
settings recommending the use of surgical
masks instead of N-95s, based on information
gathered during the 2009-2010 season.81 The
impact of this guidance, including acceptance
and compliance, should be monitored.
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2. Upgrading Surge Capacity to Be Able to Provide Mass Care to Patients 
While the H1N1 flu pandemic turned out to be
relatively mild, future pandemics could be much
worse.  Preparing for the outbreak showed how
quickly overwhelmed the medical system could
have been if the pandemic had been more severe.
During the initial phases of H1N1, outpatient
clinics and doctors’ offices were overwhelmed
and many did not have any system for triage,
separating infectious patients, or protecting
workers and their families. Emergency rooms
were overrun in spring.  In New York City alone,
44,678 people visited emergency rooms with flu
like symptoms from May 15 to June 15, com-
pared to just 4,267 the previous year.82
In the event of a severe outbreak or health emer-
gency, the health care system would be stretched
beyond normal capabilities.  Patients would
quickly fill emergency rooms and doctors’ offices,
exceed the existing number of available hospital
beds, and cause a surge in demand for critical
medicines and equipment, including antiviral
medications, ventilators, and protective masks.
Surge capacity, the ability of the medical system
to care for a massive influx of patients, remains
one of the most serious challenges for emer-
gency health preparedness. Improving health
care system preparedness means having enough
supplies, staff, and space available to treat an in-
flux of patients.  
TFAH recommended a series of ways to bolster
health care system emergency preparedness in
the Ready or Not?  Protecting the Public’s Health from
Diseases, Disasters, and Bioterrorism 2009 report,
including:
n Full funding of the Hospital Preparedness
Program (HPP) and developing a long-term
solution to funding hospital preparedness:
HPP is a federal grant program intended to
enhance the ability of hospitals and health
care systems to prepare for and respond to
bioterrorism and other health emergencies.
The funding for the HPP program is limited
and does not cover large-scale emergency ca-
pabilities.  Hospitals receive an average of
$80,000 annually, but some receive as little as
$10,000.  To be as effective as possible in the
current form, the HPP program must be fully
funded, but policymakers should also exam-
ine if HPP is the best model for preparing the
health system for a disaster.  HPP is a relatively
unstable (discretionary) funding stream, and
health facilities may not be motivated to meet
HPP grant requirements for a relatively small
sum of money. 
n Extending the Hospital Preparedness Pro-
gram to include the ambulatory care system:
During the H1N1 outbreak, doctors’ offices
and ambulatory care centers were over-
whelmed with patients, yet there is no system
in place to provide support for these
providers.  The current HPP grants could be
expanded to include these providers.
n Expanding the Hospital Preparedness Pro-
gram to include coordination with state and
local health departments: Hospital plans need
to be coordinated with state and local health
department efforts to assure appropriate first
responder, treatment and triage resources in
the community or the region being served.
n Improving crisis standards of care planning and
development:  The federal government should
take a more active role in the planning and de-
velopment of crisis of care standards and take
steps to address the legal issues created when the
need for care overwhelms available resources
(staff, supplies, and space) in an emergency.
n Improving regional coordination of health
care facilities, including alternative care
sites:  Better coordination among hospitals,
state and local health departments, and emer-
gency management agencies to build and
strengthen regional consortiums would lead
to more efficient use of resources. This in-
cludes regional coordination with local health
departments and with state health depart-
ment resources and plans.
n Addressing issues that create barriers to suc-
cessful alternative care sites:  Alternative care
sites are often one of the most efficient and ef-
fective ways to provide care in mass emergen-
cies, but issues related to facilities planning,
coordination among health agencies and
providers, licensing and liability concerns, and
resources to support the sites have meant only
limited numbers of communities have strong
alternative care plans and capabilities.
n Creating incentives and limiting obstacles to
recruiting a surge workforce:  It is essential to
set up surge workforce plans so providers are
ready for times of emergency, including creat-
ing incentives for private and public health
workers to participate, and reaching out to a
range of staff, including administrative staff,
medical technicians, EMS, public safety work-
ers, and medical and nursing students in ad-
dition to doctors and nurses.  Issues of liability,
licensing, and accreditation should all be ad-
dressed ahead of an emergency.
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3. Modernizing and Fully Funding Core Public Health Infrastructure
The capacity to track, investigate, contain and
prevent cases of H1N1 was hampered by a lack
of resources.  The public health system has been
underfunded for decades, which makes carry-
ing out day-to-day functions a challenge.  When
an emergency arises, it typically stretches public
health departments beyond their limits.  And
public health departments often do not even
have the resources they need to meet the re-
sponsibilities required to carry out an effective
seasonal flu response.
Unlike having a standing fire department or po-
lice capability, public health often only receives
supplemental “crisis funding” support to respond
to an emergency after it has already started.  
According to a range of studies, from the IOM
to CDC, many core public health functions are
antiquated or do not have enough resources --
leaving the nation unnecessarily vulnerable in
times of emergencies.  The H1N1 outbreak
strained and diverted funds that were typically
used for other public health functions from the
already-struggling system.  
A post-H1N1 assessment by HHS found the fol-
lowing major needs and gaps in sustaining state
and local operations and maintaining key infra-
structure:83
n A reliable, sustained funding stream is needed
for all core public health activities -- such as
disease surveillance, public health laborato-
ries, and communications systems -- to ad-
dress on-going public health responsibilities
and to ensure back-up capacity is available to
respond to major public health emergencies.
Two core areas that proved particularly prob-
lematic during the outbreak included: 
s Disease Surveillance:  Disease surveillance
systems in the United States have been out-
of-date and under-resourced for decades --
and it hurt the ability of health depart-
ments to track and respond to the H1N1
outbreak.  H1N1 surveillance was not uni-
form -- including having two options for re-
porting hospitalizations and deaths and
inconsistent utilization of confirmatory lab-
oratory testing -- so data could not be com-
pared across states.84 States are currently
given the autonomy to report in the way
they like.  Many local health departments
reported difficulty collecting data, and
many reported that they were strained to
even collect the minimum level of data.85
State or regional data often obscures local
and neighborhood-level differences. Some
states reported that they were unable to
keep up with processing laboratory infor-
mation, causing a backlog of information
and ultimately hindering their ability to de-
scribe the extent of the situation in their
community or state.86
PCAST has provided recommendations for ways
to improve the systems so data is rapid and eas-
ily accessible to allow experts to track the course
and severity of disease outbreaks.  This would
help identify how to target vaccination cam-
paigns, where and when additional antiviral
medications and medical equipment may be
needed, and if and when a disease is becoming
resistant to medication.  
Electronic Health Records (EHRs) hold the promise for improving many aspects of emergency health
preparedness.  Health care providers, insurance companies, and the public health system should
work together to ensure that the development of EHRs are compatible and include the ability to:
n Incorporate full and updated vaccination records for patients;
n Provide patients and their doctors with easy access to vaccine histories and reminders of
needed vaccines.  In addition, this  system should provide information to non-primary care doc-
tors, so patients can receive information about needed vaccines when they visit specialists, such
as obstetrician/gynecologists or cardiologists.  An integrated system would also make it easier
for doctors to track and reach out to patients at high-risk to remind them to get vaccinated;
n Allow health departments to track vaccination rates, surges in disease outbreaks and let people
living in communities know when there is increased risk; and 
n Let first responders know where to send patients faster and track availability of hospital beds
in real time.
ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS
s Public Health Laboratory Surge Capacity:
Within two weeks from the first recognition
of H1N1, CDC was able to develop and val-
idate the new polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) assay, manufacture the reagents, ob-
tain FDA Emergency use Authorization for
use, and begin distributing the kits to qual-
ified laboratories. 
Much of this was possible because of delib-
erate and coordinated pre-pandemic ef-
forts to expand the use of standardized
molecular tests for seasonal influenza sur-
veillance in public health laboratories.  
Although most public health laboratories
were able to quickly implement the new
assay and provide surge level confirmatory
testing for the pandemic H1N1 virus, test-
ing demand quickly exceeded federal and
state laboratory capacity in some jurisdic-
tions, which slowed states’ ability to cor-
rectly identify and describe the extent of
the disease to the public.83
Laboratory capacity has greatly improved
since the anthrax attacks in 2001, but there
are still challenges in sustaining existing ca-
pacities, managing the surge in testing de-
mand during major emergencies, and
keeping the labs up-to-date with ever-chang-
ing technologies.84
n Even in difficult economic times, it is impor-
tant to sustain the public health workforce.
Action must be taken to recruit, train, and re-
tain the next generation of public health pro-
fessionals.  Approximately 15 percent of the
local public health workforce has been cut due
to financial cutbacks in government budgets.
During the H1N1 outbreak, this meant that
many health departments were significantly un-
derstaffed.87 In addition, the federal govern-
ment had restrictions on categorically-funded
programs that meant that state and local gov-
ernments often could not reassign employees
working in other areas of public health to help
with the outbreak response.  Many state and
local governments also had hiring freezes so
many health departments could not hire addi-
tional staff to help with the response.
Currently, public health departments around the
country are facing major workforce shortages, in-
cluding lost jobs. For example about 25,000 health
workers faced reduced hours and required fur-
loughs in 2009.  In addition, local health depart-
ments have been forced to cut various programs.
Most notably, 13 percent of local health depart-
ments have made cuts to immunization programs,
nine percent have made cuts to epidemiology and
surveillance, and seven percent have made cuts to
their emergency preparedness programs.88 Health
departments around the country are also facing
an impending “brain drain” -- there are an esti-
mated 50,000 fewer public health workers than
there were 20 years ago and another one-quarter
of current public health workers around the coun-
try are eligible for retirement.89 From epidemiol-
ogists to first responders who detect and contain
diseases, the nation’s public health workforce is
vital to protecting the nation’s health.  Efforts must
be made to fill the void of expertly trained public
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